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This paper compares an Australia-New Zealand currency union to a purely 
oating ex-
change rate regime in the context of a structural, two-country open economy model.
Micro-foundations support policy assessment by facilitating direct calculation of house-
hold welfare. Analysis focuses on changing business cycle volatilities; the role of risk is not
considered. At benchmark calibration currency union is welfare reducing for both Australia
and New Zealand. Sensitivity analyses reveal these results to be qualitatively robust over
alternative degrees of shock correlation and shock transmission.
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11 Introduction
This paper compares an Australia-New Zealand currency union to a purely 
oating ex-
change rate regime in the context of a structural, two-country open economy model. Each
regime is assessed by measuring household welfare. Welfare dierences arise between
regimes due to changes in business cycle volatilities. Reduced currency risk as a result
of currency union is not considered.
Within politics and economics an Australia-New Zealand currency union has previously
been considered. Former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark proposed at a United
Nations conference in 2000 that `such a union might be inevitable'. Crosby and Otto
(2002) and Grimes et al. (2000) discussed separately benets and gains proposed by the
currency union literature in an Australia-New Zealand context. In contrast, the model in
this paper illustrates transmission and interaction of several of their arguments in a general
equilibrium framework that calculates the aggregate outcome. Specically, the model con-
siders gains from increased price and output stability through reduced nominal exchange
rate 
uctuations, as well as losses from reduced monetary policy autonomy in terms of
stance and coverage. In addition, the model tests assumptions about factor mobility and
business cycle symmetry (achieved through shock correlation and transmission) which are
two characteristics proposed by the literature as increasing the optimality of a region for
currency union (Mundell, 1961).
The New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature motivates a two-country, micro-founded,
sticky-price model1. Price-setting ability is facilitated by monopolistic competition of Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki (1987) and price rigidities are motivated through price-adjustment costs
of Hairault and Portier (1993). Each economy is subject to exogenous transitory shocks.
Currency union is modeled as a common monetary policy and elimination of nominal ex-
change rate 
uctuations. The micro-founded model facilitates direct welfare calculation and
is therefore particularly useful for policy assessment. In a two-country setting, this traces
back to Obstfeld and Rogo (1995). This paper departs from their model by introduc-
ing a distinction between the degree of monopolistic competition and the substitutability
between home and foreign economy goods. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) highlight that if
this distinction is absent, households value home and foreign goods equally and the eects
of shocks are therefore qualitatively similar independent of their source. In addition, this
paper allows for steady state income and population dierences, labour mobility and an
interest rate rule to dictate monetary policy.
At benchmark calibration currency union is welfare reducing for both Australia and New
Zealand. This implies currency union exaggerates 
uctuations in welfare variables in both
1A survey of this literature is given in Lane (2001).
2countries. Monetary policy shocks dominate benchmark results; however, qualitative re-
sults are robust to the removal of monetary policy shocks. Quantitatively results are
insignicant and therefore it is concluded that business cycle 
uctuations are irrelevant to
the exchange rate regime decision for both countries. Sensitivity analyses reveal qualitative
results to be robust over alternative calibrations of shock correlation and shock transmis-
sion (as dictated by elasticities of substitution between Australian and New Zealand goods
and import shares in consumption).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 summarises
calibrations of the 
oating regime and currency union models. Section 4 presents quanti-
tative results from the benchmark calibration and disaggregates these results by impulse
response function analyses. Sensitivity analyses are also presented which test the robust-
ness of initial results with respect to several factors that determine a region's optimality
for currency union. Section 5 will then conclude.
2 The Model
The agents of each economy are households, three tiers of rms and a central bank. There
exist markets for labour, bonds and three types of goods: intermediate, nal and consump-
tion goods2. Intermediate goods are inputs for nal goods. Final goods are internationally
traded, and are inputs for consumption goods. Consumption goods are sold domestically to
households. The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive and all other
markets are perfectly competitive.
The home country structure is presented here. The structure of the foreign country is
symmetric.
2.1 Households
There exists a continuum of utility-maximising households in each economy. The home
country population is normalised to 1 and the foreign country population is scaled by  at
the equilibrium to re
ect relative population dierences. Households within an economy
have identical preferences and face identical shocks. The behaviour of an economy's house-
holds may therefore be characterised by an innitely-lived representative. The utility of
households is increasing in consumption (Ct) and decreasing in labour hours (ht). Labour
hours are divided between the home (t) and foreign economies. Total hours worked at
home and in the foreign economy are non- separable elements of utility. Households may
intertemporally save by purchasing home (Bh
t ) and/or foreign (Bh
t ) bonds, or investing (It)
2The results of the model would be no dierent if nal and consumption good rms were excluded, in
favour of households purchasing domestic and foreign intermediate goods directly.
3in the physical capital stock for the following period (Kt+1). Households face investment
adjustment costs but no transaction costs on bond purchases. Households own domestic
intermediate goods rms and receive positive prots ( h
t ).






































where Ht = 
t (1   t)
1  ht. This form for labour utility introduces a non- separability
between hours worked at home and abroad. The value of  dictates the relative preference
for each. The household independently decides total labour hours and allocation of labour
hours. The law of motion of capital is given by Kt+1 = It + (1   )Kt. et is the nominal
exchange rate, Rh
t is the home gross nominal interest rate and Wh
t is the home wage. As
utility is strictly increasing in consumption, the budget constraint holds with equality in
equilibrium. t is an AR(1) process for preferences,
logt = %logt 1 + $h
t $h
t  N (0;$): (3)
Country-specic unanticipated changes to preferences are generated through $h
t . The
correlation of preference shocks between home and foreign economies is given by ;f.
2.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
There exists a continuum of intermediate goods rms with population density 1. The
intermediate goods rms sell output (Y i
t (a))3 domestically to nal good rms. The in-
termediate goods market is monopolistically competitive as per Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987) with dierentiated, but substitutable products. Firms set prices (P i
t(a)) taking a
demand constraint as given and face price-adjustment costs of Hairault and Portier (1993),
which may be interpreted as menu costs. Price-adjustment costs generate a sticky price
response to shocks, giving rise to nominal rigidities in the economy. The discount rate t
is the real rate of return of the rm and thus the return to the household from ownership
of the rm. The assumption of complete asset markets gives rise to non- arbitrage condi-
tions, dictating that all returns to the household must equate in equilibrium. Therefore
3i indicates the intermediate market, and a is the rm index.
4t / tt, the household's discounted marginal utility of wealth.
The rm employs home and foreign labour (ht(a)). Labour is assumed to be homogeneous
within and across countries. Labour markets are perfectly competitive.
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where price-adjustment costs are expressed in terms of the economy's nal good. The












Prots are strictly increasing in output, therefore the demand constraint holds with equal-
ity in equilibrium. The rm's production function exhibits constant returns to scale,
Y i




The production technology At is a function of lagged values of home and foreign tech-
nologies and is subject to exogenous shocks.
logAh
t = logAh
t 1 + (1   )log  Ah +  logA
f
t 1    log  Af + "h
t ; (7)
"h
t  N (0;") (8)
Country-specic unanticipated changes to technology are generated through "h
t . The form
of the process allows for symmetry in technology to be generated through two avenues.
There may exist some international transmission of economy-specic technology shocks
(), in addition to some correlation of shocks. The correlation of technology shocks be-
tween home and foreign economies is given by ";"f.  Ah and  Af are steady state values
of technology. The model is calibrated such that the steady state values re
ect relative
steady state per capita income dierences between the two economies.
The aggregate index of output across the continuum of intermediate goods rms on the












where i is the elasticity of substitution between individual rms' goods (as production
inputs for nal good rms). It will turn out that this dictates the degree of monopolistic











2.3 Final Good Firms
Final good rms input a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods to produce
a single nal good (XH). They face demand from home and foreign consumption good
rms. The market is perfectly competitive, such that they have no price-setting ability
and make zero prots. The technology of nal good rms is xed over time.
























2.4 Consumption Good Firms
Consumption good rms input domestically, New Zealand and rest-of-the-world-produced
(Xh, Xh, Xrw respectively) nal goods to produce a single consumption good (Yt) to sell
domestically. Inputs are priced in the producer's currency, such that there is full exchange-
rate pass-through. The consumption good market is perfectly competitive, therefore rms
have no price-setting ability and make zero prots. The rm's technology is xed over time.















t is the price of imports from the rest of the world in home currency terms. It is
subject to exogenous shocks:
logPrw
t = rw logPrw
t 1 + TOTt; TOTt  N (0;TOT) (14)
where the correlation of shocks across countries is given by TOT;TOT f.

















A home-bias for consumption is observed in the data, therefore the model is restricted
to situations where '1 > 0:5. This implies that purchasing power of parity never holds
in the model. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is given by 1
1 .
























t are each price indices of intermediate goods.
2.5 Central Bank
There exists a central bank in each economy setting monetary policy by a Taylor-type
interest rate rule, where the nominal interest rate is set in response to dierentials from
steady state consumption good output and in

















t; t  N (0;): (17)
4Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) nd neither the Australian nor New Zealand central banks to respond to
exchange rate 
uctuations. This conclusion is sustained through several robustness tests and conrmed in
subsequent research by Lubik (2007). Exchange rate considerations therefore do not enter the interest rate
rule.
7In
ation (t) here refers to in
ation in the price of consumption goods. t are exoge-
nous monetary policy shocks. These represent a discretionary element of monetary policy.
The correlation of monetary policy shocks between home and foreign economies is given
by ;f
5.
2.6 Balance of Payments








where  weights foreign country quantity variables to account for population dierences.








The focus is on the symmetric equilibrium, such that intermediate goods rms within
a country face the same problem and thus set the same price for any period t.
Pi
t(a) = Pi
t(a0) 8a;a0 2 (0;1) (20)
P
if
t (a) = P
if
t (a0) 8a;a0 2 (0;1) (21)
Y i
t (a) = Y i
t (a0) 8a;a0 2 (0;1) (22)
Y
if
t (a) = Y
if
t (a0) 8a;a0 2 (0;1) (23)
Additionally, a symmetric equilibrium implies:
Pi
t(a) = Px
t 8a 2 (0;1) (24)
5By denition currency union prescribes a common central bank and thus common interest rate rule.
Shocks to monetary policy in currency union are therefore perfectly symmetric by construction.
8P
if
t (a) = P
xf
t 8a 2 (0;1) (25)




























































1. given the set of prices Pt, the set of quantities Q1
t maximises domestic and foreign rms'
prot;
2. given the set of prices Pt, the set of quantities Q2
t maximises domestic and foreign
households' utility;
3. given the sets of quantities Q1
t, Q2
t, the set of prices Pt clears all markets in the sense
Y i




























t    xf
2
(29)









































































t = 0 (35)




the real exchange rate between the home economy and the rest-of-the-world, denoted in
home country currency terms.
2.8 Currency Union
Currency union implies a common central bank and xed nominal exchange rate. The
model re
ects this in a common market for bonds and setting et = 1. As this model
abstracts from money, this is the same as implementing any xed exchange rate regime.
However, the superior credibility of currency union supports the implicit assumption that
volatilities of exogenous (nancial) shocks do not change as a result of the new exchange
rate regime.
3 Calibration
3.1 Benchmark Model Calibration
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that both economies display neither growth nor
in
ation in the steady state. New Zealand's GDP per capita is around 91% of Australia's6.
The relative values of steady state technologies (  A;  Af) re
ect this ratio to create a dif-
ference in steady state household income. New Zealand's population is 20% the size of
Australia's.  = 0:2 re
ects this dierence in market size.  is the intra-temporal elastic-
ity of substitution between working a labour unit domestically and working one abroad.
Higher values of  raise the marginal utility cost of working abroad. , f are calibrated
such that the New Zealand real wage is 83% of that in Australia, given  () and  f(f).
 > f and   >  f are consistent with the higher movement of New Zealanders to Australia
than Australians to New Zealand that is evident in the data. '1 and '2 give respectively
the steady state shares of domestically produced goods and New Zealand produced goods
used in the production of consumption goods (1   '1   '2 gives the steady state share
of rest-of-the-world produced goods used in production). National Accounts data gives
that around 77% of Australian production inputs are sourced domestically, 0.73% are im-
ported from New Zealand and the remainder are imported from elsewhere. New Zealand
sources 70% of production inputs domestically, imports 6.1% from Australia and imports
the remainder from elsewhere. For both countries a home-bias in consumption is therefore
observed such that Purchasing Power of Parity does not hold. These parameters undergo
6Australian National Accounts data sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(http://www.abs.gov.au/). New Zealand National Accounts data sourced from Statistics New Zealand
(http://www.stats.govt.nz/).
10sensitivity analyses as their calibration may qualitatively in
uence results. i
i 1   1 gives
the average mark-up rate in the economy. i = 6 such that the mark-up rate is 20 percent.
 is the elasticity of total labour disutility. Following estimates of Justiniano and Preston
(2004) in a similar structural model of the Australian and New Zealand economies  is
calibrated at 0.46 for both Australia and New Zealand. Values for  ; f, the strength of
price adjustment costs, are mapped from estimates of Calvo-style price setting by Lubik
(2007). Using the optimality conditions of intermediate goods rms we derive   = 161 for
Australia and  f = 381 for New Zealand.
Following estimates by Lubik (2007) the elasticities of substitution between home and
foreign goods () for both Australia and New Zealand are set to 0.35. This parameter
undergoes sensitivity analysis. Following estimates by Preston and Justiniano (2004), &,
the persistence in the interest rate, is set to 0.82 for Australia and 0.86 for New Zealand.

Y , the coecient on the output dierential from steady state, is 0.115 for Australia and
0.155 for New Zealand7. 
, the coecient on the in
ation dierential from steady state, is
2.23 for Australia and 2.59 for New Zealand. Following calibration by Nimark and Jaaskela
(2008),  is set such that Australia's capital share in output is 29%. Following estimation
by Munro and Sethi (2007) f is set such that New Zealand's capital share in output is
25.4%.
Time series for preferences are derived from each household's intertemporal consump-
tion decision using consumption, in
ation and interest rate data for Australia and New
Zealand8. Using this preference series persistence, standard deviations and the correlation
of preference shocks are estimated. Time series for total factor productivities (technologies)
are derived from GDP, labour and physical capital data. Persistence (;f), international
transmission (;f), standard deviations and the correlation of technology shocks are
estimated from these series. In
ation, interest rate and GDP data are used to derive se-
ries of monetary policy shocks for Australia and New Zealand. These series are used to
derive the correlation of shocks between countries. Persistence, standard deviations and
the correlation of exogenous rest-of-the-world terms-of-trade shocks are estimated using
trade-weighted real exchange rate data for Australia and New Zealand. It must be noted
that each data series includes the other country and therefore estimates are inaccurate
to the extent that each economy in
uences the other's trade-weighted real exchange rate.
New Zealand represents only 3% of Australia's trade and therefore the degree of inaccuracy
is unlikely to be signicant for Australian estimates. However, Australia represents 20%
of New Zealand's total trade and therefore estimation results may be treated with some
caution. Several shock correlations undergo sensitivity analyses.
7Preston and Justiniano's (2004) estimates of the coecients on each output gap is 0.46 for Australia
and 0.62 for New Zealand; however, this uses annualized GDP data and the model presented here is in
quarterly terms, therefore these estimates have been divided by 4.
8Time series are from Q1:1990 to Q4:2007 from Source OECD (http://www.sourceoecd.org/).
11The degree of investment adjustment costs ( I; If) and the standard deviation of mone-
tary policy innovations (;
f
) for both economies are calibrated simultaneously to match
standard deviations of investment to output ratios and in
ation.
All calibrated values are given in Appendix 1.
3.2 Currency Union Calibration
In currency union there exists a common central bank and therefore single interest rate rule.
For the benchmark calibration the most likely behaviour of the central bank in currency
union must be determined. There exist two obvious alternatives. The rst is an average
of the parameter values in the Australian and New Zealand interest rate rules from the
benchmark model. The second is to retain the parameter estimates on the Australian
interest rate rule from the benchmark model. The second approach relies on the politics
of an Australia-New Zealand currency union, therefore the rst approach is adopted. The
standard deviation of currency union monetary policy shocks is calibrated conservatively
to equal that of the country with a higher standard deviation in the benchmark calibra-
tion. However, as these shocks represents a discretionary element of monetary policy their
standard deviation is endogenous to the new post-union policy environment. Therefore a
model without monetary policy shocks is additionally considered.
In addition, Australia and New Zealand's output and in
ation dierentials from steady
state must be weighted in the common interest rate rule. Again there exist two obvious
alternatives. The rst assigns a 50 percent weighting to each. The second borrows from
Europe a weighting equal to an economy's share of union GDP. This second regime again
relies on the politics of a prospective currency union. Therefore the rst weighting is used.
4 Results
4.1 A Welfare Criterion
The model provides a micro-founded utility criterion, which facilitates direct calculation
of each household's welfare (see Appendix 3). A social welfare function is not considered,
as this paper focuses strictly on policy implications. As in Carre and Collard (2003) the
gains (losses) of monetary union are expressed in terms of an expected permanent transfer




















where F is the pure 
oating regime and CU is currency union. This increases the ease of
12interpretation. If currency union is welfare improving, the result is positive (x > 0). In
the benchmark model the household would require positive consumption as compensation
for bearing the 
oating regime, rather than currency union.
4.2 Quantitative Analysis
Currency union reduces the welfare of Australian and New Zealand households (x < 0),
re
ecting overall higher volatility in consumption and labour as a result of the exchange
rate regime. However, results are quantitatively small. The New Zealand welfare reduction
equates a permanent consumption reduction of 8.4605x10-4% each quarter which is roughly
equivalent to an ice cream at a fast food restaurant every 2.2 years. The Australian welfare
reduction equates a permanent consumption reduction of 1.4826x10-4% each quarter which
is an ice cream at a fast food restaurant every 12.7 years. We therefore determine that
business cycle 
uctuations are an insignicant consideration for both Australia and New
Zealand in their choice of exchange rate regime.
Despite the insignicant magnitudes of results, the models provide a framework to un-
derstand how currency union might qualitatively in
uence welfare variables. Variance
decomposition suggests monetary policy shocks account for almost all welfare changes
(Section 4.3.1). In Australia, the result is driven by a stronger interest rate increase in
currency union as a result of reduced autonomy in setting monetary policy. This motivates
a stronger reaction of welfare variables. For New Zealand, the calibration of monetary pol-
icy shocks predominantly drives results. New Zealand bears a higher standard deviation
of monetary policy shocks in currency union due to the conservative calibration choice to
adopt Australia's higher benchmark standard deviation. This increases the magnitude of
New Zealand reactions to monetary policy shocks, reducing currency union welfare.
Due to the sensitivity of results to monetary policy shocks and calibrations, the model
is solved without monetary policy shocks. Qualitative results are robust to this alternate
stochastic environment9 and quantitatively results improve for both countries; however,
they remain insignicant. A variance decomposition for this second form of the model is
presented in Appendix 4.
4.3 Impulse Response Function Analysis
4.3.1 Variance Decomposition
Variance decomposition highlights the shocks that most in
uence results (Table 1). For
consumption and labour supply volatilities, those variables that largely determine welfare
outcomes, monetary policy shocks consistently account for over 90% of volatility changes
9Technology shock standard deviations replace monetary policy shock standard deviations as free pa-
rameters in calibrating the benchmark model.
13that result from currency union10. As a consequence of these results, impulse response
function analysis is restricted to monetary policy shocks11.
Table 1: Variance Decomposition - Dierences between Benchmark and C.U. Models
Var Cum. 1/4s Pref Preff Tech Techf TOT TOTf MP MPf
C(Aus) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0066 0.0001 99.8895 0.1035
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0118 0.0001 99.8438 0.1428
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0127 0.0001 99.8274 0.1576
C(NZ) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 1.3355 98.6632
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 1.0571 98.9394
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 1.0024 98.9940
h(Aus) 1 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0060 0.0005 99.5946 0.3984
4 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0071 0.0005 99.5785 0.4132
8 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0071 0.0005 99.5660 0.4256
h(NZ) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0014 1.1122 98.8861
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0020 1.0298 98.9679
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0020 1.0076 98.9902
4.3.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks dier in the models for two reasons. Firstly,
and most obviously, the response can depend on the exchange rate regime. Secondly, and
more subtly, the frequency of shocks is lower under currency union. A 
oating regime
dictates that Australia and New Zealand each experience one monetary policy shock every
period. In a currency union there exists only one (common) monetary policy shock every
period. To understand the qualitative results it is only relevant to compare a country's re-
sponse to its own monetary policy shock under a 
exible exchange rate against its response
to the common monetary policy shock in currency union. This is the focus of analysis.
The Australian response to a New Zealand monetary policy shock eectively disappears in
currency union. The same is true for New Zealand's response to an Australian monetary
policy shock.
10From New Zealand's perspective, in currency union Australian monetary policy shocks cease to exist.
Therefore the volatility they produce in currency union is nil. For New Zealand, the dierence in volatilities
between an Australian (
oating regime) shock and a currency union shock is simply the volatility in the
benchmark model (as currency union volatility is nil). The same is true for Australia in reaction to New
Zealand (benchmark model) monetary policy shocks. This is discussed further in section 4.3.2.
11The variance decomposition is presented for up to eight cumulative quarters. If results are extended to
20 and 40 cumulative quarters, results are broadly unchanged from those at 8 quarters.
14A positive interest rate shock increases the return on saving thereby decreasing current-
period consumption. Instantaneous nominal appreciation of the Australian currency occurs
through uncovered interest parity. As prices are unable to fully absorb the shock in the
short run, this appreciation is initially real. Production is predominantly demand-driven
in the short-run. In response to the consumption fall Australian production and labour
demand reduce. Australian prices decline; however, the decline is smaller than that which
would be observed if prices were fully-
exible. Demand for New Zealand production falls;
however, the eect is marginal due to a home-bias in Australian consumption as well as
expenditure-switching towards New Zealand goods as a result of the Australian apprecia-
tion. Australia's trade account therefore deteriorates. In general equilibrium the marginal
product of capital, and therefore the rental rate, decline. This drives a fall in the house-
hold's Tobin's q, motivating a fall in investment and the subsequent-period capital stock.
Australian labour supply falls in reaction to the reduced wage. However, the relative wage
increases as a result of the real Australian appreciation, motivating an increased share of
labour hours to be worked in Australia. Through the interest rate rule, falling in
ation
and output dampen the initial shock to the interest rate (Figure 1).
The New Zealand reaction to a New Zealand monetary policy shock under a 
exible ex-
change rate regime qualitatively matches the Australian reaction to an Australian monetary
policy shock, as described above (Figure 2).
The Australian reaction is broadly stronger under currency union than with a 
exible
exchange rate. When New Zealand is also considered for monetary policy, the dampening
in
uence that falling in
ation has on the interest rate is lessened; consequently, the interest
rate rises by more. Real exchange rate adjustment comes only as a result of relative price
movements, as the nominal exchange rate is xed. New Zealand prices are stickier and
therefore the immediate price response to the fall in consumption is smaller than that in
Australia. In contrast to the 
exible exchange rate model, the Australian currency depre-
ciates in real terms. Despite some expenditure-switching towards Australian production,
the Australian trade balance still deteriorates as a consequence of Australia's larger market
size. Labour migrates to New Zealand as the competitiveness of the New Zealand wage
improves.
Despite a more volatile interest rate, the New Zealand reaction in currency union is broadly
weaker than under a 
oating regime. The smaller Australian depreciation reduces the
expenditure-switching eect such that New Zealand production declines by less. Therefore
New Zealand labour demand, wages and labour supply fall by less. The welfare reduction
as a result of currency union predominantly derives from calibrating the standard deviation
of currency union monetary policy shocks to match that of Australia in the benchmark
model, as discussed.
15Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions to an Australian Monetary Policy Shock
































































































Blue indicates the 
oating model and green indicates currency union
16Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a New Zealand Monetary Policy Shock





































































































Blue indicates the 
oating model and green indicates currency union
174.4 Sensitivity Analyses
Sensitivity analyses are conducted on those parameters most likely to in
uence welfare
results of currency union. These are the characteristics proposed by the literature as
determining a region's optimality for currency union: factor mobility and business cycle
symmetry (achieved by shock correlation as well as shock transmission). Qualitative re-
sults are robust to most parameters tested, over reasonable ranges. Exceptions are , the
degree of Australian labour mobility, and 1
1 , the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign production. As Australian labour becomes more mobile ( reduces), currency
union becomes increasingly welfare improving (Figure 3). As  goes to 1, volatility reduc-
tion from currency union becomes innitely welfare improving as goods approach perfect
substitutability (Figure 7).
As shock correlations pref and tech increase, the cost of losing autonomous monetary
policy lessens (Figures 4 and 5). The welfare loss of currency union therefore reduces.
Changing import shares ' and elasticities of substitution between home and foreign goods
 eectively changes the degree of shock transmission. Depending on the relative volatility
of the other country, this can increase or decrease 
uctuations in welfare variables as well
as in
uencing the coordination of business cycles. Currency union's impact on exchange
rate volatility and the structure and strength of monetary policy therefore become either
more or less important. As New Zealand imports an increasing share of production goods
from Australia (as '
f
2 increases) results improve for Australia and New Zealand. However,
as Australia imports an increasing share of production goods from New Zealand (as '2
increases) the Australian result increases but the New Zealand result declines (Figure 6).
Figure 3: Response of `x' to variations in ;f









































18Figure 4: Response of `x' to variations in pref






































Figure 5: Response of `x' to variations in tech





























































































20Figure 7: Response of `x' to variations in 
































This paper has compared an Australia-New Zealand currency union to a purely 
oating
exchange rate regime in the context of a structural, two-country open economy model.
Micro-foundations of the model allowed for direct calculation of household welfare, which
is used to assess relative gains and losses from currency union.
Qualitatively currency union increases welfare variable volatilities in Australia and New
Zealand and is therefore welfare reducing for households in both countries. However, results
are quantitatively insignicant, suggesting business cycle 
uctuations are irrelevant to Aus-
tralia and New Zealand's decision of the optimal exchange rate regime. Sensitivity analyses
revealed qualitative results to be robust over alternative calibrations of shock correlation
and shock transmission (as dictated by elasticities of substitution between Australian and
New Zealand goods and import shares in consumption). In addition, qualitative results
were robust to the removal of monetary policy shocks from the model, which dominate
benchmark results.
The simple structure of the model allowed for tractable analysis; however, there are several
additions that may be interesting for further research. Analysis focussed on the impact of
business cycle volatilities and made no attempt to consider changes in currency risk as a
result of currency union. In doing so, several hypotheses of the currency union literature
were ignored - namely gains from removing hedging costs and enhanced certainty and price
transparency. It may be interesting to adapt the tractable model in this paper to consider
how these elements might in
uence shock transmission in the economy. In addition, scal
policy plays no role in this paper. However, Gali and Monacelli (2008) demonstrate the
stabilisation role of country-specic scal policy in a currency union model featuring a
continuum of small open economies. It may be interesting to assess how qualitative results
change by augmenting the model with a government sector. Finally, Carre and Collard
(2003) show that welfare implications of currency union are highly sensitive to the de-
gree of pricing-to-market behaviour, as rst introduced by Devereux and Engel (1998)as a
consideration when determining the optimal exchange rate regime.
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246 Appendix 1 - Calibration
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration Parameter Values
Australia New Zealand World Parameters Currency Union
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.99  0.99  0.2 & 0.84
f  1.46  1.46 $;$f 0.34 
Y 0.135
 0.9989  0.9447 ";"f 0.023 
 2.41
% 0.118 % 0.054 ;f 0.85  0.0075
$ 0.009 $ 0.009 # 0.5
  116   381
i 6 i 6
 0.96  0.5
 0.04  0.23
" 0.01 " 0.02
'1 0.77 '1 0.7
'2 0.007 '2 0.06
 0.3464  0.3464







 0.0075  0.0041
257 Appendix 2 - Impulse Response Functions


























































































Blue indicates the 
oating model and green indicates currency union


























































































Blue indicates the 
oating model and green indicates currency union
278 Appendix 3 - The Calculation of Welfare
Currency union presents a permanent structural change therefore to assess the welfare im-
plications of such a policy it is reasonable to measure average welfare over the full evolution
of the economy. Technically this translates to taking an unconditional (on an information
set at any time t) expectation over the innite horizon. As shocks are transitory, welfare
becomes a function of the economy's steady state and the variances of preferences (, f),
consumption (C, Cf), labour supply (h, hf) and labour location (, f). The Australian
household's welfare is given by:























































































To obtain the welfare function, one takes a second-order Taylor expansion of the household's
utility function. Remaining variables are log-linearised around the steady state. Moments
higher than second-order are not considered, as their impact on welfare is close to 0. This
method generates a welfare function in the same terms as the economy's characteristic
equations, when the model is solved. The steady state does not change as a result of
currency union. This is due to both transitory shocks centered around 0, and because the
model is solved to the rst-order, therefore risk changes between the two policies are not
considered at the steady state.
289 Appendix 4 - Variance Decomposition of Model Without
Monetary Policy Shocks
The variance decomposition is presented for up to eight cumulative quarters. If results are
extended to 20 and 40 cumulative quarters, results are broadly unchanged from those at 8
quarters.
Table 3: Variance Decomposition - Dierences between Benchmark and C.U. Models
Var Cum. 1/4s Pref Preff Tech Techf TOT TOTf MP MPf
C(Aus) 1 0.4125 0.0001 1.0973 1.1609 96.1408 1.1885 0 0
4 0.1518 0.0001 2.9968 0.7866 95.2836 0.7813 0 0
8 0.1415 0.0001 4.1179 0.0990 94.9127 0.7289 0 0
C(NZ) 1 0.0008 0.5290 0.4784 4.3735 1.6450 92.9732 0 0
4 0.0004 0.1205 1.2750 0.8063 0.9327 96.8651 0 0
8 0.0003 0.1049 2.1852 1.8127 0.8477 95.0491 0 0
h(Aus) 1 1.5971 0.0015 1.3990 15.1503 76.3280 5.5241 0 0
4 0.9564 0.0012 1.9142 12.2192 79.3374 5.5716 0 0
8 0.9355 0.0012 1.8941 14.2681 77.4372 5.4638 0 0
h(NZ) 1 0.0008 0.1438 0.2045 90.6125 0.3857 8.6527 0 0
4 0.0007 0.1000 0.3055 83.8065 0.6149 15.1724 0 0
8 0.0006 0.0900 0.2641 85.2000 0.5652 13.8801 0 0
(Aus) 1 0.1038 0.0860 0.3871 93.7316 1.9567 3.7348 0 0
4 0.0763 0.0591 0.6114 90.4389 2.6513 6.1630 0 0
8 0.0703 0.0540 0.5554 91.1970 2.4374 5.6859 0 0
(NZ) 1 0.1038 0.0860 0.3871 93.7316 1.9567 3.7348 0 0
4 0.0763 0.0591 0.6114 90.4389 2.6513 6.1630 0 0




ated equations characterise the equilibrium path of the benchmark model.

























































































































































Uncovered interest parity (log-linearised, only one condition):
^ Rh
t = Et ^ t+1 + ^ R
f
t ; (47)
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10.2 Log-Linearised Conditions Characterising the Equilibrium Path
The following de
ated and log-linearised equations characterise the equilibrium path of the
benchmark model.The system is over-identied and therefore one Euler equation is dropped
when solving the model. A bar over a variable indicates that variable in the steady state.
A hat indicates the log-deviation of that variable from its steady state.
Household inter-temporal Euler equation (symmetric for the foreign household):
 (1    (1   )) ^ zt+1+ [1   (1   )(   1)]





^ It+1   ^ Kt+1

= ^ t  ^ Ct+ I

^ It   ^ Kt

Equivalent returns from investing in bonds or capital (symmetric for the foreign household):













Intra-temporal labour-consumption decision (given for home and foreign households):
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)  
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1    f
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^ wh




Perfect risk sharing (only one condition):
^ t + ^ st   ^ Ct = ^ 
f
t   ^ C
f
t
Uncovered interest parity (only one condition):
^ Rh
t = Et ^ t+1 + ^ R
f
t ;
Law of motion of capital (symmetric for foreign country):
^ Kt+1 = ^ It + (1   ) ^ Kt
Intermediate goods rms optimality conditions (in equilibrium, symmetric for the foreign
rms):
^ wt   ^ zt = ^ Kt   ^ ht
^ x

















Production function (in equilibrium, symmetric for foreign rms):
^ XH
t = ^ At +  ^ Kt + (1   )^ ht
Zero-prot condition of consumption good rms (given for home and foreign rms):




































































































Central Bank interest rate rule (symmetric for the foreign central bank):
^ Rt = & ^ Rt 1 + (1   &)
h













































t + ^ Xrw
t

Labour market clearing conditions (given for the home and foreign economies):
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Exogenous variables (symmetric for the home and foreign economies):
^ t = %^ t 1 + $h
t ; $h
t  N (0;$)
33^ Ah
t =  ^ Ah




t  N (0;")
^ Prw
t = rw ^ Prw
t 1 + TOTt; TOTt  N (0;TOT)
Price equations (only one condition for each):
^ px
t = ^ px
t 1 + ^ x
t   ^ t (56)
^ p
xf
t = ^ p
xf
t 1 + ^ 
xf
t   ^ 
f
t (57)
^ st = ^ st 1 + ^ t + ^ 
f
t   ^ t (58)
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